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IMPALA V COMMISSION: CHANGING THE TUNE OF EUROPEAN
COMPETITION LAW
ELENA VRANAS-LIVERIS*
INTRODUCTION
On July 13, 2006, the European Union's Court of First Instance (CFI)
made history in Impala v. Commission,1 through which it annulled the 2004
decision of the European Commission (the "Commission") which cleared
the merger between music industry majors Sony and Bertelsmann AG. The
merger created the world's second largest recorded music company,
SonyBMG, which comprised one-quarter of the global music market. 2
This judgment is worthy of discussion at numerous levels, having in-
ternal ramifications for the EU, as well as global ramifications for merger
control law generally. Internally, Impala marks the first time that the CFI
reversed a Commission merger clearance decision and thus it raises many
questions regarding the EU structurally. The decision raises questions re-
garding the extent of the CFI's control over the Commission, particularly
over the Commission's merger review process, and whether the CFI's con-
trol has changed over the years. Externally, Impala creates significant con-
cern for practitioners in light of the fact that the judgment potentially
dismantled 3 a joint venture that had already been successfully operating for
two years.4 One accordingly asks whether Impala represents a considerable
* J.D. Candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2008; B.A., Political Science, Northwestern
University, 2004. 1 would like to thank my family for their continuous love and support. I also wish to
thank Professor David Gerber for his invaluable guidance on this comment.
1. Case T-464/04, Impala v. Comm'n, 2006 E.C.R. 11-2289.
2. Leo Cendrowicz, Sony, BMG Pursue Merger on Two Fronts, BILLBOARD, Oct. 28, 2006, at 25
(quoting statistic from Nielsen SoundScan).
3. Following the Impala decision, the Commission had the opportunity to reexamine the merger
using the CFI's standards, and under these new standards, found it acceptable. See Press Release,
European Union, Mergers: Commission Confirms Approval of Recorded Music Joint Venture Between
Sony and Bertelsmann After Re-Assessment Subsequent to Court Decision (Oct. 3, 2007), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/1437. Further, the merging parties had
the opportunity to appeal the decision to the European Court of Justice. It is for these reasons that I
stress that the merger was potentially dismantled.
4. The European Court of First Instance Annuls the European Commission's Decision Approv-
ing the SonyBMG Joint Venture, MEMOS (Simpson Thacher & Bartlett, New York, N.Y.), July 18,
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change in European merger control policy that may in turn affect the global
economy. In particular, one must consider whether mergers will generally
be more difficult to form under European law and whether outside forces
such as third-party competitors will have a more active role in the Commis-
sion's merger review process. This comment explores these questions with
a view of obtaining a better understanding of the effect of Impala on the
future of merger control law both in the EU and throughout the world.
Part I of this comment outlines the background necessary to under-
stand the changing role of the CFI and the impact of Impala on merger
control law. This section begins by detailing the history of the CFI. It then
discusses European merger control law doctrinally, as established in the
European Merger Regulation and Article 82 of the Treaty Establishing the
European Community (the "Treaty"). The section concludes by examining
the case law that shaped the Impala decision, particularly Schneider Elec-
tric SA v. Commission,5 Tetra Laval v. Commission,6 and Airtours v. Com-
mission7 (the "Merger Trio" 8). In each of these 2002 cases, the CFI
annulled a Commission decision prohibiting a disputed merger. Notably,
the Merger Trio was the first set of cases in which the CFI annulled the
Commission's merger decisions, although as we have now seen through
Impala, it was not the last. Part II presents the facts of Impala and evaluates
the legal analysis the CFI used to reach its conclusion. Part III discusses the
implications of Impala for the role of the CFI. Specifically, this section
demonstrates how the CFI has dramatically changed its role within the
European Union through its greater use of judicial discretion, consequently
becoming a force which the Commission cannot simply take for granted as
it may have done in years past. Part IV then discusses the implications of
Impala for merger control policy generally. Particularly, this comment
argues that Impala has heightened the standard for merger clearance deci-
sions and has encouraged third-party involvement in European competition
law.
2006, at I [hereinafter The CFI Annuls the EC's Decision], available at http://www.simpson
thacher.com/content/publications/pub558.pdf.
5. Case T-310/01, Schneider Electric SA v- Comm'n, 2002 EC.R. 11-4071-
6. Case T-5/02, Tetra-Laval BV v. Comm'n, 2002 E.C.R. 11-4381.
7. Case T-342/99, Airtours PLC v. Comm'n, 2002 E.C.R. 11-2585.
8. This term was first used to describe this set of cases by Professor Gerber in David J. Gerber,
Courts as Economic Experts in European Merger Law, in ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORDHAM
CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE: INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW & POLICY 475 (Barry E. Hawk ed.,
2004).
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I. BACKGROUND
In order to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the importance of
Impala both within the EU and globally, one must first have basic knowl-
edge of the European justice system. One must also be familiar with the
European merger control law which governs the judgment, as well as the
relevant case law leading up to the judgment. In the first section of the
comment, we examine the basic framework that is necessary to evaluate the
CFI's judgment in Impala.
A. The Court of First Instance Prior to the Merger Trio and Impala
The European Union is a fascinating political and economic system,
dependent on the synchronized functioning of its supranational and inter-
governmental institutions. Throughout the history of the EU, the institu-
tions have taken on rather defined roles, creating order and predictability.
However, one must recognize that the EU is still a dynamic political and
economic entity-one in which change sometimes leads to the advance-
ment of the Union, and sometimes to its weakening. It is thus of serious
interest to identify and evaluate changes within the institutions as the Union
advances, towards a better understanding of the EU internally, and of any
consequent global effects. For this reason, we now examine the original
role of the CFI within the EU so we can later discuss how this role has
changed in light of Impala.
Today, it is the task of both the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and
the CFI to ensure, through interpretation and application of the Treaty, that
"the law is observed." 9 The Treaty may be regarded as the constitution of
the European Union, the "legal text from which all other rules derive." 10
This awesome responsibility of ensuring that the law is observed was not,
however, always held by the CFI.
Upon conception of the European Economic Community (EEC) in
1957, the ECJ was the sole court responsible for enforcing EEC laws, and it
played an extremely active role in shaping European competition law.11 As
the Community expanded in the 1970s, however, the growing workload of
9. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, art. 220, 1997 O.J. (C340)
[hereinafter EC Treaty]; P.S.R.F. MATHIJSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN UNION LAW 106 (8th ed. 2004).
Article 225 of the EC Treaty further provides that "unless the Council decides otherwise, the provisions
of this Treaty relating to the Court of Justice ... shall apply to the Court of First Instance."
10. MATHIJSEN, supra note 9, at 107.
11. DAVID J. GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE: PROTECTING
PROMETHEUS 351-53 (1998).
2008]
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the ECJ created great concern. 12 The concern continued into the 1980s as
the ECJ became particularly busy after the 1987 passage of the Single
European Act (SEA), through which the ECJ gained the responsibility of
hearing cases relating to the single market planned for 1992.13 The goal of
achieving the single market, after all, led to a wave of mergers, acquisi-
tions, and joint ventures as firms attempted to become "European."' 14 The
justice system was increasingly burdened such that by 1988, it took the ECJ
eighteen months to respond to a request from a national court for a prelimi-
nary ruling and twenty-four months to deal with a direct action.15 More-
over, the quality of decisions arguably decreased because the ECJ became
reluctant to carry out detailed investigations into factual background in
light of its increased caseload. 16 As a result, the member states provided in
Article 11 of the SEA for a court of first instance to be attached to the ECJ.
In 1988, the Council of the European Union (the "Council") adopted the
decision which formally established the CFI, 17 and the CFI began hearing
cases in October 1989.18
At its inception, therefore, the CFI was a type of subsidiary court cre-
ated to ease the ECJ's workload by handling the spillover cases, 19 specifi-
cally the less important cases dealing with competition issues, actions
brought against the Commission under the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity Treaty, and disputes between European Union institutions and their
staff.20 Originally the Council only conferred limited jurisdiction upon the
CFI, but through decisions in 199321 and 1994,22 the Council transferred all
jurisdiction allowable under the Treaty to the CFI, which includes jurisdic-
tion to hear all direct actions brought by natural and legal persons. 23 The
CFI is therefore the first court to review the legality of acts adopted by the
12. ANTHONY ARNULL, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS COURT OF JUSTICE 14 (1999).
13. Id. The SEA's main objective, as now established in Article 14(2) of the EC Treaty, was to
complete the single market which was defined as "an area without internal frontiers in which the free
movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured."
14. GERBER, supra note 11, at 369-70.
15. ARNULL, supra note 12, at 14.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 15.
19. Id. at 16 (noting that although the quality of CFI judgments is high and the CFI has "im-
prov[ed] judicial review of complex facts," it has not had the original intended effect of creating a more
speedy justice system).
20. Id. at 15.
21. Council Decision 93/350, art. 1, 1993 O.J. (L 144) 21, 22 (Euratom).
22. Council Decision 94/149, 1994 O.J. (L 66) 29.
23. EC Treaty art. 230.
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institutions or the European Central Bank, 24 which includes reviewing any
acts of the Commission. Any action for annulment of Commission deci-
sions, including merger decisions, brought by a natural or legal person
accordingly also commences in the CFI.
The Treaty of Nice, signed in 2001, subsequently provided that the
CFI would no longer be "attached" to the ECJ, but rather would continue as
an independent institution of the EU, 25 and further, that judicial panels
could be attached to it to exercise this judicial competence. 26 Despite this
independence, all judgments of the CFI are subject to appeal to the ECJ,
though only on issues of law.27 In practice, however, appeals from the CFI
to the ECJ have been fairly infrequent, with the result that the CFI has gar-
nered much more power than the ECJ in areas of law which first come
before it, including competition law.28 Nonetheless, up until the Merger
Trio, even the CFI's "power" in merger control was rather dismal com-
pared to that of the Commission. Until the Merger Trio, the CFI never ef-
fectively exercised leadership in competition law, perhaps under the
realization that, in theory, it was not the only judicial voice that could be
heard on the subject.29
As the judicial role in merger control law narrowed in the late 1980s
and 1990s, the Commission took on a stronger role in shaping competition
policy without paying much deference to the courts. 30 Indeed, until the
Merger Trio in 2002, the Commission almost exclusively controlled Euro-
pean competition law. It is for this reason that the Merger Trio and ulti-
mately Impala are so significant in illustrating a new wave of leadership in
this area of law.
B. European Merger Control Law
The objective of European competition law is to ensure that "competi-
tion in the internal market is not distorted." 31 The Commission plays a key
24. MATHIJSEN, supra note 9, at 140 (citing EC Treaty arts. 225, 230).
25. Treaty of Nice Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the Euro-
pean Communities and Certain Related Acts, Mar. 10, 2001, art. 2(26), 2001 O.J. (C 80) (now EC
Treaty art. 220) (declaring that "The Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance, each within its
jurisdiction, shall ensure that ... the law is observed") (emphasis added).
26. Id.
27. ARNULL, supra note 12, at 14.
28. Id.
29. GERBER, supra note 11, at 375.
30. Id. at 375-76.
31. MATHIUSEN, supra note 9, at 243-44; see also EC Treaty art. 3(l)(g).
2008]
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role in enforcing competition law, 32 seeking to "ensure that markets func-
tion properly and, ultimately, that [the] consumers do not suffer as a result
of having to pay higher prices or being offered poor choice. ' 33 In this sec-
tion, we will look at the codified merger law which has been adopted to-
wards achieving these goals.
European merger control law revolves around Regulation 4064/89 (the
"Merger Regulation" 34) which was adopted by the Council in 1989, and
considerably amended by the Council in 200435 as a result of the Merger
Trio, which is discussed below. Prior to the adoption of the Merger Regula-
tion, mergers were regulated solely by Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty.
Standing alone, however, these articles proved insufficient for merger regu-
lation,36 and thus the Commission actively called for specific legislation on
merger control. The resulting Merger Regulation provided that "concentra-
tions," including mergers and acquisitions, as well as joint ventures, 37
which have a "community dimension, ' '38 are subject to Community (as
32. See Council Regulation 17, 1959-1962 O.J. SPEC. ED. 87 (establishing the procedures that the
Commission follows in order to implement European competition policy).
33. Mario Monti, Keynote Address: Merger Control in the European Union-a Radical Reform, in
EC MERGER CONTROL: A MAJOR REFORM IN PROGRESS 5, 6 (Gotz Drauz & Michael Reynolds eds.,
2003). This consumer-oriented policy of the Commission is especially characteristic of the "economic
approach" movement that began in the 1990s and has since shaped much of European competition law.
This movement focuses on the use of economic models and quantitative analysis in deciding cases and
enacting legislation. The Commission's decision to clear the SonyBMG merger and the CFI's judgment
to annul this decision illustrate the importance of the "economic approach" movement today, as both
relied on economic arguments and quantitative evidence to come to their conclusions. Although the
particulars of the "economic approach" movement are outside the scope of this comment, it is an ex-
tremely important and controversial topic that is worthy of discussion. For an overview of the "eco-
nomic approach" movement in European competition law, see ECON. ADVISORY GROUP ON
COMPETITION POL'Y, AN ECONOMIC APPROACH TO ARTICLE 82 (2005), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/publications/studies/eagcp-july-21-05.pdf; Neelie Kroes, Euro-
pean Comm'r for Competition Pol'y, Address at the GCLC/College of Europe Conference: The Refined
Economic Approach in State Aid Law: A Policy Prospective (Sept. 21, 2006), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/commission-barroso/kroes/speeches-en.html; Mario Monti, European Comm'r for
Competition, Address at the UNICE Conference on Competition Policy Reform (May 11, 2000), avail-
able at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp2000 009_en.html; European Comm'n,
Directorate General for Competition: Mission Statement, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/mission/
(last visited May 3, 2008).
34. Commission Regulation 4064/89, 1990 O.J. (L 257) 14 [hereinafter Merger Regulation].
35. Council Regulation 139/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 24) 1 [hereinafter 2004 Merger Regulation]. For a
useful overview, see JOHN J. PARISI, A SIMPLE GUIDE TO THE EC MERGER REGULATION (2007), avail-
able at http://www.ftc gov/bc/intemational/docs/ECMergerRegSimpleGuide pdf.
36. See ARNULL, supra note 12, at 446-48 (noting that Article 82 applied only where there was a
pre-existing dominant position to be abused, and Article 81 could not necessarily be applied to all
mergers).
37. For purposes of clarity, all types of concentration will be referred to as "mergers" throughout
this comment.
38. A merger has a community dimension when it exceeds the thresholds provided by Article I of
the Merger Regulation: five billion euro and 250 million euro of sales within the EU, unless more than
[Vol 83:3
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opposed to national) regulation. 39 A concentration occurs when two or
more previously independent undertakings merge, or where one or more
persons or undertakings, already in control of one or more undertakings,
acquire control of one or more other undertakings. 40 In these instances, the
merger must be reported to the Commission prior to implementation. Un-
der the Merger Regulation, applicable to the Merger Trio and Impala,41 the
Commission thereafter may prohibit the merger where it "creates or
strengthens a dominant position. '42 Only after the Commission clears a
merger may it properly be implemented.
In deciding competition cases where there is a question of a dominant
position in the market, as was the issue in Impala, the judiciary is also
guided by Article 82 of the Treaty. The primary goal of Article 82, as is the
goal of the Merger Regulation, is to promote competition in order to protect
consumers, not necessarily competitors. 43 Article 82 provides: "Any abuse
by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common
market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with
the common market insofar as it may affect trade between Member
States." 44
As we have seen, the concept of dominance arises both under the
Merger Regulation and Article 82, and thus calls for further attention.
Dominance under European law is "a position of economic strength which
enables [an undertaking] to prevent effective competition being maintained
on the relevant market by giving it the power to behave to an appreciable
extent independently of its competitors, its customers and, ultimately, con-
sumers."'45 To make this determination, a court must analyze a business in
relation to its "relevant product [or] service market" and "relevant geo-
two-thirds of each party's sales within the EU are from the same Member State. These thresholds will
be reviewed before July 1, 2009.
39. GERBER, supra note 11, at 379.
40. Merger Regulation, supra note 34, art. 3.
41. The Merger Regulation is applicable to all merger agreements signed before May 1, 2004. See
Press Release, European Union, Mergers: Commission Opens In-Depth Investigation Into Sony/BMG
Recorded Music Joint-Venture (Mar. 1, 2007), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.
do?reference=lP/07/272.
42. Merger Regulation, supra note 34, art. 2(3). Under the 2004 Merger Regulation, this domi-
nance test was changed such that the Commission could prohibit a merger where it would "significantly
impede effective competition, in the common market or in a substantial part of it," retaining dominance
as a factor in this test. 2004 Merger Regulation, supra note 35, art. 2(3).
43. EC Treaty art. 82.
44. Id.
45. Case T-210/01, Gen. Elec. v. Comm'n, 2005 E.C.R. 11-5575, 114; see Case 85/76, Hoff-
mann-LaRoche & Co. AG v. Comm'n, 1979 E.C.R. 461, 4.
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graphic market. '46 The ECJ has defined a relevant market as one in which
"there can be effective competition between the products[] which form part
of it and this presupposes that there is a sufficient degree of interchange-
ability between all the products forming part of the same market in so far as
the specific use of the product is concerned. '47 Collective dominance oc-
curs when two or more undertakings present themselves or act as a collec-
tive body in the relevant market.48 Abuse of a collective dominant position
"does not necessarily have to be the action of all the undertakings in ques-
tion. It only has to be capable of being identified as one of the manifesta-
tions of the collective dominant position. '49 In light of the above, defining
the relevant market is undoubtedly a crucial factual inquiry in competition
law, one that has provided the CFI with significant control due to its posi-
tion as the ultimate judicial fact-finder in competition cases.
Nevertheless, the Commission has maintained tremendous power un-
der the Merger Regulation and under Article 82, because all mergers must
first be reported to and decided upon by the Commission. Furthermore,
with the increase in proposed mergers,50 the Commission has gained an
expertise in competition law, which for many years has perhaps given the
Commission a false sense of infallibility. The decisions of the Commission,
however, are subject to judicial review.51 Under Article 230 of the Treaty, a
decision may be annulled by the ECJ or the CFI "on grounds of lack of
competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, in-
fringement of [the] Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application,
or misuse of powers." 52 As this comment illustrates, the CFI in particular
has recently taken an aggressive role in reviewing the Commission's
merger control decisions and consequently shaping European merger con-
trol law.
46. MATHIJSEN, supra note 9, at 245.
47. Id. (quoting Case 31/80, L'Oreal v. DeNieuwe AMCK, 1980 E.C.R. 3775).
48. DG Competition Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusion-
ary Abuses, 44 (Dec. 2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/art
82/discpaper2005.pdf (citations omitted).
49. Id. 74 (citations omitted).
50. See VALENTINE KORAH, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EC COMPETITION LAW AND PRACTICE
307 (7th ed. 2000) (noting that in 1989, the Commission dealt with approximately fifty to sixty notifica-
tions per year, but by 1999 nearly 300 mergers were reported to the Commission).
51. Merger Regulation, supra note 34, art. 2 1(1); see also Mark Clough, The Role of Judicial
Review in Merger Control, 24 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 729, 732 (2004) (arguing that judicial review is
ultimately the "only effective available method of holding the Commission accountable" for its deci-
sions).
52. EC Treaty art. 230.
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C. The Merger Trio
The CFI first demonstrated its increasing power in competition law
opposite the Commission in a series of three judgments: Schneider Electric
SA v. Commission,53 Tetra Laval v. Commission,54 and Airtours v. Com-
mission,55 each of which annulled a Commission decision prohibiting a
proposed merger. 56 Until these 2002 judgments, the CFI had left the merger
control decisions of the Commission virtually untouched. It came as a
rather stinging surprise, therefore, when the CFI attacked the Commission
in all three cases for lack of transparency and erroneous economic reason-
ing,57 finding that the Commission committed manifest errors of assess-
ment and of law. These judgments raised significant questions about how
the Commission should evaluate mergers, particularly with regard to the
standard of proof and the level of economic analysis that the Commission
must use to properly justify its decisions. On the other hand, questions were
also raised as to the validity of the CFI's assumed role as an economic ex-
pert, 58 particularly in its criticisms of the Commission over proper eco-
nomic analysis.
Factually, Schneider Electric dealt with Schnieder Electric's acquisi-
tion of the French company Legrand, which would have resulted in com-
bined market shares in the electrical equipment sector ranging between
40% and 90%, with the effect that the French company would become the
world's largest manufacturer of low-voltage electrical equipment.59 On
October 10, 2001, the Commission ordered that the companies separate,
even though at the time Schneider had already acquired approximately 98%
of Legrand. 60
Similarly, in Tetra Laval, the Commission ordered that Tetra Laval, a
carton packaging manufacturer, split from Sidel, a leading manufacturer of
polyethylene terephthalite (PET) packaging equipment, even though Tetra
Laval had already acquired approximately 95% of Sidel.61 The Commis-
sion found the merger incompatible with the Common Market because it
53. Case T-310/01, Schneider Electric SA v. Comm'n, 2002 E.C.R. 11-4071.
54. Case T-5/02, Tetra-Laval BV v. Comm'n, 2002 E.C.R. 11-4381.
55. Case T-342/99, Airtours PLC v. Comm'n, 2002 E.C.R. 11-2585.
56. Gerber, supra note 8, at 475.
57. See id. for a more detailed discussion of the CFI's economic analysis of the Merger Trio.
58. Id.
59. Press Release, European Union, Commission Prohibits Acquisition of Control of Legrand by
Schneider Electric (Oct. 10, 2001), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?refer
ence=IP/01/1393.
60. Id.
61. Case T-5/02, Tetra-Laval BV v. Comm'n, 2002 E.C.R. 11-4381, 11.
2008]
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would allow the new entity to use its dominant position in the carton pack-
aging market to gain a dominant position in the PET packaging market.62
Additionally, the merger would reinforce Tetra Laval's dominant position
in the carton packaging market by eliminating the competitive constraint
that existed between the carton and PET packaging markets.63
The CFI annulled both decisions, noting problems with the Commis-
sion's factual findings and economic analysis. In Schneider Electric, after
closely reviewing the Commission's market definition, the CFI found that
the Commission's assessment was fraught with inconsistencies because the
Commission oscillated between defining the market at narrower product
and national levels, and at the broader European level. 64 It is especially
striking that the CFI based its ruling on concerns of flawed economic
analysis while outwardly maintaining that it owed deference to the exper-
tise of the Commission in evaluating economic issues, which it viewed as
being rooted in the very structure of the EU institutions. 65 The CFI noted in
Tetra Laval that "the substantive rules of the [Merger] Regulation, in par-
ticular Article 2, confer on the Commission a certain discretion, especially
with respect to assessments of an economic nature. '66 This tension between
the CFI's role as an economic expert and the CFI's deference to the Com-
mission's economic expertise seems to indicate that the CFI was not ready
to openly challenge the Commission's leadership in the area of competition
law; nonetheless, the CFI began to mark its influence in the area. The CFI's
confidence in its power over merger control law was further illustrated in
Tetra Laval through the assertion of a new standard of proof under which
the Commission, in order to prohibit a merger, was required to provide
"convincing evidence" to support its findings that a merger would harm
competition.67
Airtours is the most significant case of the Merger Trio because it
"clarified the Commission's evidentiary burden" in merger control cases, 68
particularly in situations involving oligopolistic markets where there are
concerns of collective dominance-an issue which also played a part in the
Impala decision. In Airtours, the Commission prohibited the merger be-
62. Id. 143.
63. Id.
64. Case T-310/01, Schneider Electric SAv. Comm'n, 2002 E.C.R. 11-4071, 48, 148-49.
65. Gerber, supra note 8, at 481-83.
66. Tetra-Laval, 2002 E.C.R. 11-4381, 119.
67. Id. 155,254.
68. Oliver Bretz, Merger Hopefuls Should Take Note of Sony-BMG Debacle, THE LAWYER (Lon-
don), July 24, 2006, at 8. But see Yves Botteman, Mergers, Standard of Proof and Expert Economic
Evidence, 2 J. COMP. L. & EcON. 71, 72 (2006) (arguing that the standard of proof is still "ill defined").
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tween the British tour operators Airtours and First Choice, because it would
lead to a collective dominant position in the UK short-distance foreign
package vacation market. 69
The CFI's judgment annulling the Commission's decision both shaped
the current understanding of collective dominance and created a "[h]eavy
burden on the Commission to 'reason"' its merger decisions. 70 First, Air-
tours established a framework for analyzing collective dominance that
European law had been lacking, providing that the following factors are
decisive in determining whether a collective dominant position exists: (1)
market transparency, which is the ability of each member of a dominant
oligopoly to be aware of the conduct of the others in order to check
whether or not they are adopting a common policy in the market; (2) possi-
bility of retaliation, which involves the existence of mechanisms to deter
possible deviation by members of the dominant oligopoly from the com-
mon policy, in turn creating an incentive for the members of the oligopoly
not to depart from the common policy; and (3) inability of current and fu-
ture competitors and consumers to jeopardize the common policy. 71 Sec-
ond, Airtours signified that the Commission categorically needed to
improve its reasoning in merger decisions. After determining that the
Commission did not prove the requisite legal standard of collective domi-
nance, the CFI rebuked the Commission, stating that "the Decision, far
from basing its prospective analysis on cogent evidence, is vitiated by a
series of errors of assessment as to factors fundamental to any assessment
of whether a collective dominant position might be created. '72
The Merger Trio created great uncertainty regarding the European
merger control process and the role of the CFI in shaping competition law.
For some observers, Airtours was a turning point in competition law which
demonstrated a decline in the Commission's ability to prohibit mergers, 73
while for others, Airtours had a rather limited impact on the Commission's
decision-making abilities, requiring only greater clarity and precision of
assessment, but not infringing on the Commission's use of its economic
expertise. 74 In any case, it is unquestionable that the Merger Trio sparked
69. Commission Decision, 2000 O.J. (L 93) I, 194.
70. F.O.W. VOGELAAR ASSISTED BY MARIETTA SCHUERMAN, THE EUROPEAN COMPETITION
RULES 279 (2004).
71. Case T-342/99, Airtours PLC v. Comm'n, 2002 E.C.R. 11-2585, 62.
72. Id. 294.
73. E.g., John Kay, A Missing Element: The Airtours Case Showed How EU Merger Proceedings
Fail To Give Consumers a Voice, FIN. TIMES, June 18, 2002, at 17.
74. E.g., Frank Montag & Andreas von Bonin, Collective Dominance in Merger Cases after
Airtours, in EC MERGER CONTROL: A MAJOR REFORM IN PROGRESS, supra note 33, at 323, 325.
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the Commission to introduce change in European competition law. The
embarrassing reversals of the Merger Trio forced the Commission, under
the leadership of then-Commissioner for Competition Mario Monti and his
Director General for Competition Philip Lowe, to improve its merger re-
view process, particularly in the area of economic analysis. These reforms
included, among others, the creation within the Commission of "devil's
advocate panels," or peer review panels which challenge the conclusions
reached by a particular case's review team, and the addition of a chief
competition economist supported by a staff of professional economists. 75
Furthermore, as mentioned above, the Commission spent years revising the
Merger Regulation, which culminated in a new regulation being adopted in
2004. The 2004 Merger Regulation includes, among other changes, a more
flexible timetable for review, simplified procedures of referral from the
Commission to national legislatures, stronger fact-finding powers in the
Commission, and most importantly, a new substantive test for merger
clearance. 76
Impala was thus decided after the Commission had devoted several
years to reforming the decision-making process in merger control law. This
fact highlights the assertiveness of the CFI in deciding Impala. This was
not a situation where the CFI reprimanded the Commission in 2002 and
then returned to the shadows in fear that it had overstepped its authority;
rather, the CFI never stopped garnering strength. And by 2006, through
Impala, the CFI took a commanding leadership role in merger control law
by maintaining that the Commission's attempt at reform was insufficient. It
is in light of this dynamic background that we explore the Impala judgment
and its substantial effect on European competition law.
II. IMPALA V. COMMISSION
With the necessary background, we now explore Impala in greater
depth. This section provides an overview of Impala v. Commission by illus-
trating the facts that brought rise to the CFI's judgment, from the Commis-
sion's clearance decision to the appeal by the Independent Music
Publishers and Labels Association ("Impala") to the CFI. We then look at
the CFI's holding, which entailed that the Commission made a "manifest
error of assessment," namely in concluding that the merger between Sony
and Bertelsmann did not constitute a collective dominant position.
75. William Kolasky, GE/Honeywell: Narrowing, but Not Closing, the Gap, ANTITRUST, Spring
2006, at 69; see also EC MERGER CONTROL: A MAJOR REFORM IN PROGRESS, supra note 33.
76. 2004 Merger Regulation, supra note 35.
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A. Facts
On July 19, 2004, after a five-month review of the proposed merger,
the Commission approved the joint venture of Sony and Bertelsmann
which created SonyBMG. 77 As a result, SonyBMG became the second
largest recorded music company in the world and was part of a market
consisting of four majors representing approximately 80% of global sales.78
Accordingly, the primary issue that the Commission faced during the re-
view was whether SonyBMG, along with the other three major record la-
bels, or "majors"-EMI, Universal, and Warner-would gain collective
dominance in the European recorded music market. The Commission per-
mitted the merger because it found that there was insufficient evidence that
the merger would lead to a collective dominant position, as defined in Air-
tours, for the four resulting major recorded music companies. 79 Specifi-
cally, the Commission believed that the price transparency necessary for
tacit coordination was not present in the recorded music market in light of
the fact that the majors offered heavy discounting off list prices to large
retailers. 80 Furthermore, the Commission found that the majors lacked the
retaliatory mechanisms necessary to punish firms for deviating from any
tacit coordination. 81
On December 3, 2004, Impala, an international association whose
members include 2500 independent music production companies, re-
sponded by appealing the Commission's merger clearance decision to the
CFI.8 2
B. Holding
To annul all or a portion of a merger decision by the Commission, the
CFI must find that the Commission made a "manifest error of assess-
ment.' '83 In its evaluation of whether the Commission made a manifest
error of assessment, the CFI applied the test for collective dominance as set
forth in Airtours and discussed above.84
77. Commission Decision, 2005 O.J. (L 62) 30.
78. Bretz, supra note 68, at 8.
79. Commission Decision, 2005 O.J. (L 62) 30, 31.
80. Id. 15-24.
81. Id.123.
82. Case T-464/04, Impala v. Comm'n, 2006 E.C.R. 11-2289, 1.
83. See Case T-210/01, Gen. Elec. v. Comm'n, 2005 E.C.R. 11-5575, 60 ("[T]he Community
judicature's power of review is restricted to verifying that the facts relied on are accurate and that there
has been no manifest error of assessment.") (citations omitted).
84. Impala, 2006 E.C.R. 11-2289, 247.
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After examining the Airtours factors, the CFI held that the Commis-
sion did not properly demonstrate the non-existence of a collective domi-
nant position before the merger or the absence of risk that a collective
dominant position would occur after the merger.85 Specifically, the CFI
found that lack of transparency was not sufficiently supported by the
Commission's theory that promotional discounts reduce transparency of the
market. 86 Also, the CFI found that it was not enough to rely on the absence
of evidence that retaliatory measures had been used in the past in order to
show that there was no possibility of a dominant position.87 The CFI fur-
ther suggested that there may have existed retaliatory mechanisms, includ-
ing the ability to exclude a major from compilation albums, in the event
that the major deviated from the common policy. 88
The CFI's judgment was groundbreaking in that it entailed a compre-
hensive review of the evidence relied upon by the Commission, specifically
the Commission's economic findings. As stated above, for instance, the
CFI did not accept at face value the Commission's economic theories re-
garding when market transparency and retaliatory mechanisms existed.89
Prior to the Merger Trio, the CFI almost certainly would have deferred to
the Commission's economic expertise and accepted these theories, leading
to a judgment aligned with the Commission's clearance decision. In Im-
pala, however, the CFI embraced the concept, first asserted in the Merger
Trio case, that the Commission is susceptible to improper decision making.
The CFI further extended the authority it had asserted in the Merger Trio
by reviewing the case de novo. In effect, the CFI gave no deference to the
Commission's expertise, either in general economic matters or in its spe-
cific knowledge of the evidence generated through the merger review. It is
also noteworthy that the CFI held that approvals of the SonyBMG merger
by competition authorities outside of the EU, including in the U.S., were
irrelevant to its analysis. 90 Thus, the CFI even more manifestly expressed
that it would rely upon only its own analysis of the evidence in deciding the
case.
In light of the striking position taken by the CFI in Impala, we begin
to explore what Impala suggests about the changing role of the CFI within
85. Id. 289-459.
86. Id.
87. Id. 463-73.
88. Id. 467.
89. Id. 77 289-473.
90. Id. 478.
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the EU, and just how much Impala has affected, or will affect, merger con-
trol law worldwide.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
Impala represents a major change in the role of the CFI since it was
first created in 1988 to help the ECJ handle its caseload. This shift in role,
however, should come as no surprise. The CFI's role in the European Un-
ion did not first change in Impala, nor during the Merger Trio; rather, the
CFI's role has been evolving almost from the time of its creation. The
Merger Trio and Impala act as kind of indicators of the CFI's continuously
morphing role.
In the very least, the analysis of this change may begin by acknowl-
edging that the CFI's role is certainly no longer confined to helping the
ECJ expedite the review process, as is apparent from the CFI's own bur-
geoning caseload. On the contrary, by the end of 1998, the ECJ was work-
ing more slowly than it was prior to the establishment of the CFI.91
Changes now need to be made to enable the CFI to cope with its own in-
creasing workload.92 After recognizing that the CFI's role has changed to
some extent, we now explore how the CFI's role changed and what the
scope of that role currently is.
To a significant degree, the CFI's role was altered by forces outside of
the CFI itself, namely other EU institutions. The Treaty states that "[e]ach
institution shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this
Treaty."93 Therefore, the CFI acts appropriately so long as it acts within the
powers conferred upon it by the other institutions-and it has done just
this. First, the Council extended the CFI's judicial role by expanding its
jurisdiction through decisions in 199394 and 1994. 9 5 Perhaps most impor-
tantly, the CFI could thereafter exercise jurisdiction over any review of the
legality of acts adopted by the institutions or the European Central Bank. 96
This expanded jurisdiction empowered the CFI within the institutional
structure of the EU because it caused the CFI to be a kind of "equal" to the
91. ARNULL, supra note 12, at 16. But see Bo Vesterdorf, The Court of First Instance of the
European Communities After Two Full Years in Operation, 29 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 897, 903-04
(1992) (describing that the CFI significantly reduced the caseload of the ECJ in the first two years of its
establishment and that the ECJ's continued increase in overall work is in spite of the CFI).
92. ARNULL, supra note 12, at 16-17; see also Amendments to the Rules of Procedure of the
Court of Justice, 2000 O.J. (L 322) 1 (enacted by the CFI in order to expedite proceedings).
93. EC Treaty art. 7(1).
94. Council Decision 93/350, art. 1, 1993 O.J. (L 144) 21 (Euratom).
95. Council Decision 94/149, 1994 O.J. (L 66) 29.
96. EC Treaty arts. 225, 230.
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other institutions (though still a lesser equal because the CFI was attached
to the ECJ), able to check, or even restrain, the other institutions-in the-
ory. Later, through the Treaty of Nice, the Member States further empow-
ered the CFI structurally by detaching it from the ECJ altogether.97 As a
completely independent body, the CFI could decide cases largely based on
its own standards, and thus could significantly shape European law, sepa-
rate from the ECJ-in theory.
Additionally, the ECJ has expanded the judicial review of the CFI,
stating that the CFI is not only entitled to examine "whether the evidence
relied on is factually accurate, reliable and consistent but also whether that
evidence contains all the information which must be taken into account in
order to assess a complex situation and whether it is capable of substantiat-
ing the conclusions drawn from it.''98 This last factor gives the CFI signifi-
cant discretion in shaping each case before it, as well as the power to shape
whole areas of law, as demonstrated by Impala, because the CFI is not
bound to accept evidentiary conclusions made by the other institutions,
even despite respective expertise-in theory.
Therefore, since its inception, the other institutions have continuously
been expanding the CFI's role, not limiting it. Nonetheless, the CFI did not
embrace its expanding role until the Merger Trio and ultimately Impala;
hence the qualification that this expansion was merely in theory.
Irrespective of whether the CFI embraced the new influence that came
with these changes, the CFI began to acquire a distinct expertise in compe-
tition law, which acted to further change its role. Much of the CFI's exper-
tise in competition law resulted from the CFI's increasing separation from
the ECJ. Doctrinally it is important to note that although decisions of the
CFI may be appealed to the ECJ, the ECJ may only review questions of
law, 99 allowing the CFI to be the ultimate decider of fact. In competition
cases, this distinction becomes critical. Identifying the relevant market,
which is central to any merger control judgment, is largely a question of
fact. Therefore, when the CFI prohibits a merger based on its conclusion
that the relevant market is lacking competition, as it did in Impala, the ECJ
can do very little (unless, of course, the ECJ finds a problem with the CFI's
relevant legal analysis). Furthermore, competition cases are rarely appealed
to the ECJ in the first place, which has naturally emboldened the CFI. This
rareness of appeal may be a result of procedural obstacles and the fact that
97. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
98. Comm'n v. Tetra Laval, 2005 E.C.R. 1-987, 1 (appeal from Tetra-Laval v. Comm'n).
99. EC Treaty art. 225.
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merger cases are particularly time-sensitive, considering companies are
simply unwilling to deal with further court delays due to fear of lost
funds. 100 Consequently, the ECJ hears very few competition cases. The
ECJ has therefore become less confident in dealing with those competition
cases that do reach it, 101 and would rather defer to the CFI on competition
issues. The situation becomes almost circular: the rareness of appeal may
be a result of practitioners' current recognition that, unless there is a clear
error of law, the ECJ will most likely simply defer to the CFI in competi-
tion cases because of its expertise, which in turn furthers the CFI's exper-
tise, and so forth. Effectively then, the CFI has become the sole judiciary
power in European competition law. With this new role and developed
expertise, it is not surprising that the CFI has increased the judicial scrutiny
to which the Commission is subject in matters of competition law. 102 Im-
pala is thus groundbreaking not because it showed that the CFl had the
power to effectively counter the Commission-this was apparent for
years-but rather because it showed that the CFI was ready and willing to
exercise this power to counter the Commission.
The last factor that has changed the CFI's role is the composition of
the CFl itself. There are currently twenty-seven members of the CFl, with
at least one judge representing each Member State. 103 The members are
appointed for six-year terms and collectively elect the CFI President for a
three-year term. 104 The President of the CFI at the time Impala was de-
cided, Bo Vesterdorf of Denmark, was a member of the CFI since 1989 and
was elected president in 1998.105 Many observers believe that Versterdorf
was integral in shaping the CFI over much of the last decade. For instance,
even in the first years following the establishment of the CFI, Vesterdorf
actively supported the expansion of the CFI's jurisdictional reach. 106 He
argued that the Council should give the CFI all possible authority under the
Treaty to further lessen the ECJ's workload, 107 and even hinted as to how
100. Gerber, supra note 8, at 488.
101. ARNULL, supra note 12, at 397 (citing David J. Gerber, The Transformation of European
Community Competition Law?, 35 HARV. INT. L.J. 97 (1994)).
102. Id.
103. MATHIJSEN, supra note 9, at 139 (referencing EC Treaty art. 224).
104. Id.
105. The current president of the CFI is Marc Jaeger, who has held this position since September of
2007. For a list of past and current CFI judges, see The Court of First Instance, The Members,
http://curia.europa.eu/en/instit/presentationfr/index-tpi.htm (last visited May 4, 2008).
106. Vesterdorf, supra note 91, at 905.
107. Id.
2008]
CHICAGO-KENT LA WREVIEW
the CFI could achieve this maximum authority. 108 Furthermore, Vesterdorf
espoused using new procedures that the ECJ was historically reluctant to
use, such as amicable settlements, 109 perhaps in an effort to emphasize the
CFI as an autonomous authority.
The CFI's role has unquestionably changed within the EU framework
since the CFI's conception in the late 1980s as a subsidiary court to the
ECJ. Through the influence of the other institutions, a developed expertise
in competition law, and dynamic leadership, the CFI has become extremely
influential within the EU and consequently worldwide, specifically in com-
petition law. In this area of law, the CFI no longer stands as second-best to
the ECJ, but rather as the dominant judicial authority. Most importantly,
Impala suggests that the CFI is now ready to use this authority, which was
first realized in the Merger Trio, toward actively shaping merger control
policy. This leads us to the next section of this comment, which explores in
further detail what Impala implies for the future of merger control policy.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR MERGER CONTROL LAW
As our world becomes ever smaller through new technologies in
transportation and communication, global business becomes ever more
commonplace. Therefore, merger control law stands only to gain impor-
tance with the increase of international undertakings. It is thus in the inter-
est of practitioners throughout the world, if they have anything to do with
global business, to be familiar with the merger control standards of various
economic powers, including the EU. This section discusses the notable
effects of Impala on European competition policy, including a heightened
standard for merger clearance decisions and the encouragement of third-
party involvement in competition cases.
A. Heightened Standard of Merger Clearance Decisions
When discussing the legal standard in any case, one must consider
both the relevant standard of proof and the standard of review.1 10 It is im-
portant to note that in the context of European competition law, due to the
108. Id. at 905 n. 10 (noting that the 1991 Maastricht Treaty contains a proposal to amend Article
168(a) of the EC Treaty, whereby the Council would receive the requisite authority to extend the juris-
diction of the CFI).
109. Id. at 913-15.
110. For a clear description of the distinction between the two standards, see Tony Reeves &
Ninette Dodoo, Standards of Proof and Standards of.Judicial Review in European Commission Merger
Law, 29 FORDHAM INT'L. L.J. 1034, 1037 (2006).
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economic complexity of the cases, these standards are often closely
linked-so much so that they are often regarded as one general concept. I I
The Merger Regulation unfortunately provides no express provision as to
the requisite legal standard for merger clearance decisions. There has ac-
cordingly been great debate over the years to define this standard.' 12 Many
observers begin the debate by looking at whether the Merger Regulation
implies a presumption of legality for mergers. Although cogent arguments
have been made on behalf of a presumption of legality and neutrality, the
ECJ has never ruled on the matter, 1 3 leaving the issue of the requisite stan-
dard to be decided by the CFI as cases come before it.
The issue was highlighted in the Merger Trio, where the CFI articu-
lated the standards it used to decide the cases. In Airtours, the CFI placed a
rather high burden on the Commission, requiring it to prove whether pro-
posed mergers passed or failed a three-prong test (discussed in Section I.B,
supra) when there were concerns of collective dominance. More generally,
the CFI held in the Merger Trio that the Commission bore the burden of
providing "convincing evidence" that a transaction would "in all likeli-
hood" restrict competition."l 4 Although somewhat vague, this standard was
unquestionably more demanding than what the Commission had been ac-
customed to. 1 15
In Impala, the CFI seemed to impose the same burden on the Com-
mission as set forth in the Merger Trio, but in order to establish that a joint
venture does not restrict competition. 1 6 Effectively then, the burden estab-
lished in Impala may be more stringent than that in the Merger Trio under
the principle that a negative is always more difficult to prove than a posi-
tive. In fact, most countries' merger statutes presuppose that a merger is
lawful; in order to prohibit the merger, the government must thereafter
prove that the merger restricts competition. 1 7 After Impala, however, in
order to clear a merger, the Commission bears the burden, using "all rele-
111. Id. at 1061-62. In this comment that concept will be referred to as "the standard."
112. See, eg., id. at 1042-47 (describing the different views of whether there is a presumption of
legality of mergers in the Merger Regulation).
113. Id. at 1047.
114. Case T-5/02, Tetra-Laval BV v. Comm'n, 2002 E.C.R. 11-4381, % 148, 155; The CFI Annuls
the EC's Decision, supra note 4, at 3.
115. The Commission consequently appealed the CFI's judgment arguing that the CFI had "signifi-
cantly raised the level of standard of proof required from the Commission to prohibit a conglomerate
merger and has thereby gone beyond the review of legality." Appeal Brought on 13 January 2003 by the
Commission of the European Union Against the Judgment Delivered on 25 October 2002 by the First
Chamber of the Court of First Instance, 2003 O.J. (C 70) 3, 1.
116. The CFl Annuls the EC's Decision, supra note 4, at 3.
117. Id.
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vant data," of proving that a merger does not restrict competition.11 8 This
implies that the CFI has established a presumption of neutrality of mergers,
where the Commission has a positive obligation to find a merger restrictive
or not restrictive of competition.
In any case, the CFI has created more work for the Commission in
formulating binding merger clearance decisions. To meet the high standard
set by the CFI, the Commission will undoubtedly need to spend more time
and money gathering and analyzing data because it knows that the CFI will
rigorously review everything. In analyzing the effect of the new standard,
observers are thus faced with a new cost-benefit analysis, weighing the
costs of added time and money against the benefits of coherence and eco-
nomically sound reasoning.
On the one extreme, the higher standard may impair a system that is
already fraught with efficiency problems. In this situation, an investigation
conducted with the added costs may lead effectively to the same merger
clearance decision (or perhaps only a marginally more coherent or eco-
nomically sound decision) as an investigation without the added costs. For
instance, following Impala, the Commission was required to thoroughly
reexamine the merger between Sony and Bertelsmann. Ultimately the
Commission expended more resources to reexamine the merger, only to
confirm its original finding that the merger is legal. 19 Furthermore, in fu-
ture cases, the Commission may take part in extensive reviews of mergers
in highly complex markets, even though the mergers would otherwise be
appropriate for clearance after little scrutiny. 120 These extended reviews
may simply represent increased financial and time costs in a system which
has long been dealing with efficiency difficulties. If we include the added
costs outside of the institutional framework, the analysis becomes even
more one-sided. For example, companies that already successfully received
merger clearance from the Commission may now have to seek legal advice
that they would not otherwise be seeking, out of fear that the joint venture
will be required to separate long after having received clearance. Also,
companies that would otherwise want to merge may no longer even con-
sider the undertaking because of the added uncertainty and expenses result-
ing from the stricter review process. This situation was illustrated by the
abandoned merger discussions of EMI and Warner, shortly following the
118. Id.
119. Press Release, supra note 3. For commentary on the added costs of this second investigation,
see Susan Butler, Maligned by a Merger, BILLBOARD, Dec. 22, 2007, at 36.
120. Bretz, supra note 68, at 8.
[Vol 83:3
CHANGING THE TUNE OF EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW
Impala judgment. 121 This reluctance to merge because of added review
costs could potentially weed out even pro-competitive merges, which
represents a further cost to the overall economy.
At the other extreme, the higher standard may lead to Commission de-
cisions which are consistently more coherent and economically sound than
decisions made prior to Impala. In this situation, the added costs of a more
thorough review are marginal compared with the increased quality of deci-
sions. To begin with, concerned with being overturned by the CFI, the
Commission may take great strides to reform the review process such that
as years pass, the system will be refined to the point that it provides for
coherent and economically sound decisions at very little cost. The merging
parties will further lower costs because they have an incentive to provide
the Commission with accurate information regarding the market.122 Merg-
ing parties will no longer allow for otherwise favorable factual misinterpre-
tations by the Commission, because they know that these misinterpretations
may be uncovered at the judicial level, only to cause greater loss of time
and money in trying to defend the merger a second time around. These
aligned interests of the Commission and the parties towards a more legiti-
mate system would greatly outweigh any extra time or monetary costs.
As is normally the case, there also exists a middle ground. It is possi-
ble that the higher standard will create a situation in which the costs of
more stringent review are equal to the benefits of higher quality Commis-
sion decisions. In practice, this could occur in a number of ways. For in-
stance, the costs of review may only slightly increase such that the quality
of decisions also only slightly increases. In this situation, the Commission
would effectively be countering the CFI's newly established authority.
Namely, by refusing to make major changes to its review process, the
Commission would show that it is not intimidated by the CFI's power of
judicial review. Alternatively, the costs of review may significantly in-
crease such that the quality of decisions also significantly increases. Here,
the Commission would effectively be acknowledging and supporting the
CFI's new authority, which would indicate a major shift in actual power in
European merger law. Still, the great cost associated with this latter situa-
tion could take a toll on the system as whole.
121. Emiko Terazono & Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson, EMI Shelves Its Plans for Warner Merger,
FIN. TIMES, July 27, 2006, at 19. Months after Impala, discussions between EMI and Warner recom-
menced, though it is still far from certain whether these discussions will lead to a proposed merger. See
Julia Werdigier, Warner Music Makes New Bid For EMI After 4 Failed Offers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21,
2007, at C8.
122. Simon Neill & Douglas Peden, Competition: Clearance and Confusion, LEGAL WEEK, Sept.
21, 2006, http://www.legalweek.com/Articles/130599/Competition+Clearance+and+confusion.html.
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In the end, the effect of the heightened standard established in Impala
will only become clear over time. It is for this reason that observers must
pay close attention to the Commission's merger decisions over the next few
years. By looking at recent merger decisions, we can more completely as-
sess the effect of Impala on merger control policy as well as on the alloca-
tion of power on merger control issues. The heightened standard truly
signifies the current dynamic state of European merger control law.
B. Third-Party Interests
Another topic of ongoing interest within European competition law,
which Impala implicitly addressed, is the status of third parties in competi-
tion proceedings. 123 Doctrinally, Article 19(2) of Regulation 17124 and
Article 27(3) of Regulation 1/2003125 provide that a third party has the
right to be heard during the Commission's review of a proposed merger.
Indeed, there is authority for the proposition that it is a fundamental right of
a third party, just as it is that of a party to a proposed merger, to be heard
"before any individual measure which would affect him or her adversely is
taken. ' 126 Historically, however, beyond the initial Commission review, it
has been rather difficult for third parties to bring a case for annulment of a
merger decision.
On its face, the Treaty only allows private applicants to challenge de-
cisions which are either addressed to the private parties themselves, or
which are of "direct and individual concern" to the private parties. 127 Pri-
vate applicants, unlike the institutions, have no express right under the
Treaty to challenge regulations or directives. 128 In practice, the courts have
somewhat broadened private applicants' standing in annulment cases by
allowing a private party standing when the party is heard during an admin-
istrative procedure which leads to the Community act in question, particu-
larly in competition cases. 129 Still, this is an informal expansion of standing
at best, and in no way secures the right of third parties to bring an annul-
123. For an in depth discussion of third-party standing in EU competition cases, particularly during
the Commission's review process, see Calvin P. Jellema, The Redheaded Stepchild of Community
Competition Law: The Third Party and Its Right To Be Heard in Competition Proceedings, 20 B.U.
INT'L L.J. 211 (2002).
124. Council Regulation 17, 1959-1962 O.J. SPEC. ED. 87.
125. Council Regulation 1/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1.
126. Jellema, supra note 123, at 281 (citing Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,
art. 41, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1).
127. ARNULL, supra note 12, at 40.
128. Id.
129. Id. at42.
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ment action against a merger decision. Furthermore, private applicants who
are not heard during the Commission's review proceedings have almost no
access to the courts in responding to a merger decision. This limited access
to the courts by third parties in competition matters has led to significant
discussion over standing policy. Proponents of a broader rule have argued
that relaxation of the standing rules protects the public interest and actually
promotes the democratic process by allowing public participation in deci-
sion-making. 130 Alternatively, proponents of a narrow rule have argued that
broadening standing, particularly within the CFI, would provide individuals
with too much power considering the international ramifications of many
of the competition cases. 131
The CFI clearly took a side in this debate by authorizing Impala, an
independent music association which was not a party to the original merger
proceedings, to bring a successful case for annulment against the Commis-
sion. Once again, however, the actions of the CFI should not come as a
complete surprise. The CFI has for many years implicitly supported broad-
ening the rights of third parties, noting that the right to bring a case for
annulment should "not be interpreted restrictively."' 132 Ultimately, how-
ever, it is the fact that a third party actually won an annulment case against
the Commission in Impala that illustrates the potential strength of third
parties before the CFI. As a result, Impala will encourage private parties to
bring future challenges before the CFI.
This receptiveness at the judicial level will also provide private parties
with more confidence to lobby the Commission in its initial merger deci-
sions. After all, knowing that the CFI accepts annulment cases brought by
third parties, the Commission will be compelled to take third-party interests
into account during its merger review process. Such effects are already
being seen. For example, following the acquisition of Bertelsmann's music
publishing business by Vivendi, Impala was quick to suggest that it would
lobby the Commission to invalidate the merger. 133 And even if the Com-
130. Id. at47.
131. Id. at 47-48 ("[]n international law the very notion of an individual having independent
standing to sue before an international tribunal is little short of revolutionary.") (quoting Eric Stein &
G. Joseph Vining, Citizen Access to Judicial Review of Administrative Action in a Transnational and
Federal Context, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 219, 222 (1976)).
132. Joined Cases T-528/93, T-542/93, T-543/93, T-546/93, Metropole T616vision SA v. Comm'n,
1996 E.C.R. 11-649, 60.
133. Gerrit Wiesmann & Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson, Vivendi Wins $2bn Auction for BMG Pub-
lishing, FtN. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2006, at 27; see also Doreen Carvajal, Rivals May Challenge a Proposed
Vivendi-Bertelsmann Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2006, at C14 (quoting Impala president Patrick Zelnik,
as saying "we have a strong case to oppose this merger and it's even stronger than SonyBMG").
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mission were to allow the merger, Impala could confidently continue its
fight in the CFI.
As the CFI broadens its standing policy, practitioners must be aware
of practical ramifications. Although allowing for a more democratic proc-
ess, the increase of third-party involvement in competition cases will likely
also lead to practical problems, including burdening European courts and,
of particular interest to practitioners, creating greater uncertainty for com-
panies interested in joint ventures. Traditionally, upon the Commission's
merger clearance, companies assumed a confidence that they could con-
tinue with their venture. Now, however, not only must these companies
spend much more time and money during the Commission's review proc-
ess to obtain the Commission's clearance, but they must tread ever so care-
fully even after receiving clearance because a third party might
successfully appeal the decision. When representing a party to a proposed
merger, practitioners should therefore be aware of and if necessary address
third-party concerns at the outset to avoid later appeals.
CONCLUSION
Impala is a crucial case in CFI jurisprudence, one which illustrates a
dynamic European competition law. First, within the EU, Impala represents
a major structural change. By establishing itself as an authority in competi-
tion law, the CFI has checked the once seemingly boundless authority of
the Commission. Second, Impala is important globally because it repre-
sents a policy change in European competition law. Specifically, Impala
raises the standard for merger clearance decisions within the EU and it
encourages third-party participation in competition cases.
The effects of these changes can only be seen over time, but they are
of significant concern for all practitioners doing business with those global
undertakings that do not want to be in the current position of Sony and
Bertelsmann. To be sure, the parties in Impala have no choice but to battle
over the CFI judgment. Sony and Bertelsmann unveiled a two-pronged
strategy to rescue their merger, which entailed reapplying to the Commis-
sion for clearance of the merger and appealing the CFI ruling to the ECJ. 134
The first prong proved successful, as the Commission cleared the merger
again in October 2007.135 Although SonyBMG can thus continue to operate
as a single entity, it cannot be too quick to celebrate. Impala stated that it
would call for a formal inquiry into the Commission's investigation and
134. Cendrowicz, supra note 2, at 25. Throughout the appeal, SonyBMG has continued to operate.
135. Press Release, supra note 3.
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that a second appeal is possible, which could lead to legal fees reaching
well into 2010.136 Furthermore, in December 2007, the Advocate General
of the ECJ issued an opinion recommending that the ECJ uphold the CFI's
judgment on appeal, 137 giving great credibility to the CFI's ability to
counter the Commission.
Although the effects on the parties in Impala may be trying, the effects
on competition law generally may be very beneficial. It is possible, after
all, that Impala will lead to more coherent and economically sound Com-
mission decisions brought about by more democratic proceedings, such that
only truly pro-competitive mergers are cleared, leading to a stronger global
economy. We can only hope this will be the case in this new period of
European competition law.
136. Press Release, Impala, Independent Music Companies Call for Enquiry Into EC's Approval of
SonyBMG Merger (Oct. 3, 2007), available at http://www.euractiv.com/29/images/Impala_031007
_tcm29-167339.pdf; see also Cendrowicz, supra note 2, at 25.
137. Case C-413/06 P, Bertelsmann AG v. Impala, 2006, available at 2007 WL 4334882.
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